Michael Beckley is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Tufts University and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. A leading scholar of U.S.–China strategic competition, he is the author of Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower and co-author, with Hal Brands, of Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict with China. In this conversation, Beckley reflects on the family stories and Cold War memories that drew him to geopolitics, why he thinks the United States retains huge long-term advantages over China, and why that very imbalance makes the coming decade especially dangerous. He talks through his concerns about China’s debt, militarization, and potential for aggression, his skepticism toward parts of academia, and the growing demand for geopolitical analysis across government, think tanks, and the private sector. For students thinking about foreign policy careers, he offers blunt advice on expertise, risk-taking, and avoiding the temptation to “build a brand” before you’ve done the hard work. 
This transcript has been edited for clarity and length.​

Early Influences and the Pull of Geopolitics
BW: Professor Beckley, thank you for speaking with me.
To begin, I’d love to hear about the path that led you to this field. What sparked your interest in international relations and U.S.–China competition? Was there a defining moment, or was it a long-standing passion?
MB: I think it’s always been a passion of mine. I’d point to two big influences.
One is my family—I’m half Japanese. On the Japanese side, my grandmother was interned during World War II, but her three brothers were fighting for the U.S. military. One was killed, one was wounded, and one of her cousins served in a special operations unit in the Asian theater. He spied on Japanese units and called in strikes—he was later inducted into the Army Rangers Hall of Fame.
Meanwhile, another cousin protested the internment and took his case all the way to the Supreme Court. He lost in a unanimous 9–0 decision and was sent to jail. So knowing that family history gave me a sense that geopolitics can have massive impacts on people’s lives.
The second influence was just growing up in the 1990s, right after the Cold War. One of my earliest memories is of the Gulf War. I remember expecting it to be like World War II, and instead seeing the U.S. military just demolish Iraqi forces. That showed me the immense power of the United States, and I’ve always been fascinated by that.
And then, of course, there were all the movies--Top Gun, The Hunt for Red October. I thought that stuff was so cool. So I was always really interested.

Academia, Policy, and the Frustrations of the Ivory Tower
BW: You’ve worked in both academic and policy circles. How do those worlds differ, and how has that shaped your approach to research and influence?
MB: I was trained as an academic, which is good in the sense that it teaches you rigor and research design. But I actually think a lot of what academia produces is pretty irrelevant and useless.
The direction academia has been going for a long time is, in my view, pretty poor: increasing specialization, an overemphasis on methods for their own sake, and a lot of what I’d call faux social justice work rather than hard-hitting analysis. I’ve become increasingly disgusted with academia in general.
I’ve always been much more interested in policy, because I feel like: what’s the point unless you’re engaged in major debates that actually have an impact? Especially coming from the United States, I think the U.S. has a special obligation to use its power responsibly. If you’re writing about international affairs, you have an obligation to engage in those national debates.
For me, I always wanted to do policy, but there isn’t much “middle management” in the policy world. You’re either a lowly research assistant or a senior scholar. I had to get a PhD and go through the academy to earn credentials and show my work before I could really have a consistent voice in national debates.
So it’s always been about wanting to do policy, but having to get the academic training and earn my stripes along the way. I’m glad I did it, but it wasn’t particularly fun.

U.S. Power, China, and the “Danger Zone”
BW: On that note, in Unrivaled you argue that fears of U.S. decline are exaggerated, and that fears of China’s inevitable rise are overblown. That message feels especially urgent today, with rising tensions over Taiwan and the South China Sea.
Do you still believe the U.S. holds a decisive long-term advantage—and what metrics matter most?
MB: After Unrivaled, which focused on big-picture indicators of national power, I still think the U.S. has tremendous latent advantages: its wealth, its technology, its military potential, its alliances, the dollar’s global role, and energy production. The U.S. is a hub for many countries—militarily, economically, diplomatically—and that gives it enormous power.
What China is really good at is churning stuff out. They’re massively ramping up their military. So I worry a lot about the local balance of power, especially in the Taiwan Strait and across maritime East Asia.
I also worry that the United States historically doesn’t really mobilize until it gets punched in the face. I see the U.S. being fairly lackadaisical about countering China.
In 2019, I wrote a Foreign Affairs article called “The U.S. Should Fear a Faltering China,” where I looked at cases of rising great powers whose ascent stalled. The pattern is that they tend to militarize and become more aggressive in the short term. It seems like China is doing the same thing.
That led to my second book with Hal Brands, Danger Zone. The argument is that in the long run, the U.S. has significant advantages over China. But in the short term, because China is militarizing and mobilizing so quickly, there’s this extremely dangerous window where Beijing might “roll the iron dice”—gamble on an assault on Taiwan, the Philippines, Japan, or other targets in East Asia.
There’s a lot the United States needs to do to insulate itself and deter that kind of move from happening in the first place. So I’ve become less confident about the U.S. ability to deter China in the near term, even though I remain relatively confident about the long-term balance of power. But that can all be thrown off if the U.S. gets thrashed in a war over Taiwan—that would change the trajectory dramatically.
That’s why so much of my work in the last five or six years has been trying to sound the alarm about what China is doing.

The Costs of a Taiwan War
BW: Do you think a conflict over Taiwan would ultimately be better or worse for American global positioning?
MB: I think it would be catastrophic for everyone involved. I don’t see any real winners.
A lot would depend on how the war played out, but even if the U.S. “wins”—meaning China fails to take Taiwan—if you look at the history of great power wars, they tend to be much messier and longer than people expect going in.
And given that both the U.S. and China have nuclear weapons, it’s just not something I even want to contemplate. I think it would be catastrophic for China, but that doesn’t mean it would be good for the United States.

Debt, Power, and U.S. Vulnerabilities
BW: What do you make of the U.S. debt-to-GDP ratio in terms of American global positioning? It’s top of mind right now with the “One Big, Beautiful Bill” passing the House, which critics say could add trillions to the national debt. Is that a telling indicator?
MB: First, I’d use different statistics. The Bank for International Settlements measures total credit to the non-financial sector—that includes government, household, and business debt. For China, that figure is over 300 percent of GDP, and that’s probably conservative because local governments hide a lot of debt.
You can easily find reporting on this. Even the People’s Bank of China acknowledges how serious the problem is. China’s debt situation is extremely bad. But that doesn’t mean America’s fiscal position is good.
I’m very concerned about U.S. debt, especially with possible extensions of massive tax cuts. With interest costs rivaling the defense budget, plus the wave of baby boomer retirements, we’re putting a huge burden on future generations. Just because others are worse off doesn’t mean we’re in good shape.

Skills and Career Paths for a New Generation
BW: Shifting gears, many of our readers are students trying to find their path in international policy. What skills or mindsets do you think are most valuable for contributing meaningfully to foreign policy analysis or academia?
MB: There are different skill sets that are useful.
One path is the one I took: academic, original research. That’s valuable because it forces you to think systematically—like a scientist—about how to build a valid body of evidence and test your hypotheses. Even if you don’t use that language when you’re writing essays, going on TV, or briefing policymakers, that style of thinking helps you avoid cherry-picking evidence and just spouting hot takes.
Another great training ground is journalism. I have a lot of respect for journalists who know what it takes to really get to the bottom of a story—talking to everyone involved, reading everything, and then coming to solid conclusions.
There are also increasing opportunities in the private sector for your generation. When I was growing up in the 1990s, people thought we were at the “end of history,” and that major geopolitical conflicts were unlikely. There wasn’t as much demand in the private sector for geopolitical expertise. Now, almost every bank I know has some kind of geopolitical or political risk analysis wing, and there are major firms that specialize in that.
That kind of work can be very rigorous, because when there’s money on the line, people tend to take analysis seriously.
Then you have the government analyst route, and the area specialist path—immersing yourself in a particular country or region, learning the language, living there, going into the archives like a historian.
To me, it’s about the depth of knowledge you can acquire when you’re young so that later you have real expertise to draw on. Starting narrow and then building outward is a good way to go.

How to Contribute in a Time of Great Power Competition
BW: For students who are trying to build that foundation—if someone in college asked, “How can I contribute meaningfully to U.S. foreign policy in a time of great power competition?” what would you say?
MB: There are so many ways, and I actually think long-term planning is a bit overrated.
My advice would be: do next year what you genuinely want to do next year, and really throw yourself into it. Then see where things shake out.
In our conversation, I’ve given you a neat summary of my career path, but it only makes sense in retrospect. At the time, it felt incredibly chaotic and uncertain and all over the place.
You’re learning so much, you never know who you’ll meet or what opportunities will open up. So go with your gut and what seems like the best option right in front of you.
Maybe that’s a really interesting study abroad program, or an independent research project you can take on. Usually, the opportunities that are tough and require you to move or stretch yourself—those are the ones to take as early as possible, when your opportunity costs are lower.
As you get closer to your thirties, life gets real very quickly, and it becomes much harder to just pack a bag and go. So I’d say: take the plunge early, whether that means moving to a foreign country, taking on a massive research project, or something similarly demanding.
What I often see instead is young people setting up social media accounts and Substacks as if they’re already big-name public intellectuals. They spend so much time building a “brand” instead of really honing expertise. They might sprint ahead of their peers for a bit, but they’ll fall behind those who have accumulated real expertise, research skills, and experience.
So my advice is: take your medicine early.

Reading the World
BW: Thank you so much for those insights. One last question—you’re clearly well read. If there were one book, essay, or other piece of literature you’d recommend to someone interested in your career path or foreign policy more generally, what would it be?
MB: It sounds cliché, but I think you should definitely read War and Peace. It’s such an amazing, granular yet sweeping epic. It tells you a lot about the lived experience not just of war, but of mass social movements and how people get swept up in them.
I’m also a huge fan of Stephen Kotkin. His claim to fame is his three-volume biography of Stalin, but his many other books and talks—he’s a Russia/Soviet specialist—give him a very clear-eyed view not just of Russia today, but also of the Chinese Communist Party and geopolitics more broadly. You don’t even have to read all his books; just listening to his podcasts is incredibly valuable.
And if you want to do U.S.–China specifically, you’ve got to read John Mearsheimer’s The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, even if you don’t agree with everything. It’s important for framing how you think about what to look for in the behavior of big states. Those would be my main recommendations.

BW: Dr. Beckley, thank you again for sharing your insights today. Your work challenges some of the most dominant assumptions about global power, and I really believe our audience—especially students thinking about their role in public service or international affairs—will benefit from hearing a more grounded, long-term view.
MB: Thanks so much for having me, and best wishes with all your studies. I look forward to seeing how your career progresses.

Getting Started in Foreign Policy
BW: Mr. Abrams, thank you so much for joining me. The Pathway Blog is meant to help students understand careers in foreign affairs, law, and public service by learning from people who’ve done the work. You’ve done that across multiple presidencies and regions—from Latin America during the Cold War to the Middle East in the 21st century. To start, what first drew you into public service? Was foreign policy always the goal, or did your interests evolve?
EA: For me it was always foreign policy. Going back to college, that’s what interested me most, and I was pretty sure I wanted to do something related to Washington and international affairs.
I was lucky to meet Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson and work on his presidential campaign. After law school, I tried practicing law and found it boring. That was the moment I decided, “Okay, I need to get back to what I actually care about.” I got in touch with Senator Jackson, went down to Washington, met with him again, and joined his staff. That’s how it started.

Serving Under Different Presidents
BW: You’ve served across very different administrations. That kind of longevity requires both flexibility and conviction. How do you maintain strategic focus while navigating the ideological shifts from Reagan to Bush to Trump?
EA: The key is understanding that shifts are inevitable. Each president is different, and obviously there will be big changes when power moves between Republicans and Democrats. That’s fine—as long as you know what you believe.
You also have to remember that you’re not the president, and you’re not the secretary of state. You’re advising. You’re going to lose some battles—times when you’re convinced “A” is the right course but your principal picks “B.” That’s part of the job.
Government is a gigantic bureaucracy with lots of compromise. You accept that as the price of having any influence at all. The line I’ve tried to keep is: if a policy decision is fundamentally unconscionable and directly related to what I’m working on, that’s when you have to be prepared to leave. If it’s outside your lane—say you’re working on Iran and Venezuela and you disagree with immigration policy—that’s harder to justify as a reason to resign.

Morality, Realism, and Human Rights
BW: Diplomacy is often portrayed as a game of grand strategy, but it also carries serious moral weight. How do you personally weigh moral imperatives against strategic necessities, especially in regions like the Middle East?
EA: Every official has to decide how much weight to give human rights and democracy promotion compared to other interests—security, economics, diplomacy. A government is not an NGO; trade-offs are inevitable.
Let me give you an example. At the end of Trump’s first term, I was working on Iran. We had the “maximum pressure” campaign. The goal—at least as Trump saw it—was not regime change, but a deal that ended their nuclear program.
I remember thinking: if he wins reelection and we get to a point where sanctions are lifted in exchange for a nuclear deal, that could mean a lot more money for the regime and a kind of normalization with the Islamic Republic. I would have seen that as a serious abandonment of the Iranian people, and I don’t think I could have stayed.
More broadly, you can adopt a very “realpolitik” approach where human rights and democracy are almost irrelevant to your definition of the national interest. That’s essentially Donald Trump’s view—he made it quite clear, for example, in his Riyadh speech. I think that’s a mistake. Americans do care about values. I don’t believe they want a foreign policy that’s indifferent to the oppression of women, the execution of gay people, or stolen elections.
And beyond morality, our association with liberty is itself a strategic asset. Look at countries facing China or Russia—the fact that the United States stands for freedom helps hold alliances together.

Arguing with Kissinger (and Others)
BW: You’ve been compared to Henry Kissinger in the sense that both of you operated at the intersection of realism and moral complexity—and both faced criticism. How do you respond to those critiques? Do they play any role in your decision-making?
EA: I hope the critiques themselves don’t drive decision-making. What should matter is your own judgment about the balance of American interests.
Kissinger and I have disagreed for decades, going back to the Reagan years. We argued a lot about Latin America. His view was that figures like Chile’s military ruler, Augusto Pinochet, were valuable Cold War allies—anti-communist—and that pushing too hard for democracy risked producing something worse, as he believed had happened in Iran under the Shah or Nicaragua under Somoza. Jeanne Kirkpatrick had a version of that argument too.
My view was more conditional. If pressing for human rights and democracy is likely to produce a more repressive, anti-American regime, then don’t do it. But in Chile’s case, I didn’t think that was true. Chile had a long democratic tradition. We knew the democratic opposition leaders; they came to Washington, and I took them to see Secretary Shultz. We had a very good sense of what a post-Pinochet government would look like. So we pushed for elections.
To me, these are prudential judgments. Where I think Kissinger, Nixon, and Trump are wrong is in discounting the value of America’s reputation as a champion of liberty. That’s not just moral vanity—it’s a real source of strength.

The 21st-Century Challenge: China
BW: Looking generationally, what’s one foreign policy challenge you believe my generation will have to approach differently than previous ones?
EA: The big one is China. During the Cold War, we faced a military adversary, the Soviet Union, whose economy was weak and largely disconnected from ours. We traded almost nothing with them.
Now, in the 21st century, we face a major military and intelligence challenge from China and a level of economic interdependence that would have been hard to imagine in the 20th century. We need their supply chains and they need our markets.
That combination—deep economic ties plus strategic rivalry—is something we’re still learning how to handle. And it’s not going away. If you and your fellow students are in government in 2050, you’ll still be dealing with it.

Why Students Should Still Choose Public Service
BW: Many young people today are passionate about global affairs but skeptical of institutions or disillusioned by politics. What would you say to them?
EA: Get involved. It’s not going to get better if principled people opt out.
There are always plenty of people without strong principles who go into government for power or as a springboard to money later on. The only way to counter that is to have better people in the system—both the elected officials and the thousands of appointees every president brings in.
I was fortunate to work with a lot of talented, principled civil servants and young political appointees who really did see government as a period of service before moving on. If people like your peers walk away, nothing will improve about the nature and quality of our government.

Lessons About Luck and Public Life
BW: Is there anything you know now—about leadership, decision-making, or public service—that you wish you’d understood at the start of your career?
EA: Two things.
First, luck is critical. You don’t control who wins elections. Your team may win or lose, and that can determine your entire trajectory. If you don’t get that first or second job, you may never get the third or fourth. You should work hard, write, and prepare—but luck plays an enormous role.
Second, American politics today is in a pretty ugly cycle. The parties attack each other personally in ways they didn’t, say, 25 years ago. People entering public life should expect unfair attacks at some point. That comes with the territory in a way it doesn’t if you stay entirely in the private sector.

Reading Recommendations
BW: You’re clearly well read. If you had to recommend one book or essay to someone who wants to follow a similar path or get involved in government, what would it be?
EA: There isn’t one definitive book, especially since I’ve never worked at the state level. But for understanding the presidency and national security, Peter Rodman’s Presidential Command is excellent—it shows what presidents actually do and how they do it.
I’d also recommend Dean Acheson’s memoir, Present at the Creation, for a sense of what it’s like to help build U.S. foreign policy from inside government in its early postwar years.
BW: Mr. Abrams, thank you again for your time and candor. I know many of our readers hope to enter foreign policy, law, or diplomacy, and they’ll take a lot away from this conversation.
EA: I hope it was useful. Thank you—and good luck.